May 14, 2006
Quantum Note
The Middle East Equation
Dr. Muzaffar Iqbal
Iran stands at a threshold Pakistan and India crossed in 1998 by successfully testing their atomic bombs, the result of years of overt and covert research in an area of science and technology no non-Western nation is ever supposed to approach. No one really bothered about the Indian bomb, conceding tacitly that a rising giant such as India had a right to the unmentionable device, but there was a lot of talk about Pakistan’s “Islamic bomb”, the dangers it posed to Israel, the possibility of its passing into the hands of “Islamic radicals”, as the current “Islamic extremists and terrorists” were then called. Sanctions were imposed on Pakistan and India, of course, only to be lifted in the due course of time. The fuss fizzled out soon enough for everyone to remain in their comfort zones. Eight years later, no one remembers the fuss over the two bombs and the “great danger” in South Asia, and the world is neither less safe or more dangerous due to these two new nuclear powers; both countries are carrying out their business with the rest of the world as usual. The case of Iran may, however, be different.
For the Untied States of Americans and Europe, the rise of Iran as a major regional power is not acceptable for a variety of reasons. In their geopolitical considerations, they have assigned that status to India whose sheer size, population, and secular character makes it an acceptable choice for them. This so-called largest democracy of the world, in turn, has been taking confident steps in that direction through solid economic progress, thriving institutions, and developments in science and technology. The case of Iran is different, not only because it is a Muslim country—though that is certainly a consideration—but also because its rise as a regional power will upset the entire Middle Eastern equation as established immediately after World War II.
The key ingredients of that post-World War II Middle East policy are the security of Israel, reliable supply of oil, and a mechanism to ensure perpetual division and inner disharmony in this hub of Islam. These three key ingredients of Middle East policy are shared by the United States and its European partners. If Iran were to acquire economic, political, and technological strength beyond a certain limit, its impact on the Middle East would alter the entire equation so carefully established and kept operative over the past half century.
Iran was already poised to alter that equation in 1979, because the transforming force of the Iranian Revolution could have turned the country into a regional power within a decade. But that potential was successfully blunted by the United States through the long and cruel war imposed on the nascent Islamic Republic. It is no secret now that the attack on Iran by Saddam Hussein was masterminded not in Baghdad but in Washington DC; no less a person than a former President of the United States, Richard Nixon, has admitted it in his 1992 book, Seize the Moment: “Our interests demanded that neither side emerge as a clear-cut victor, and the Reagan administration acted correctly in playing both sides. In allowing arms sales to Iraq, the mistake was to exceed the amounts needed to check Iran’s offensive capabilities, thereby enabling Saddam Hussein to become a military menace after the war” (p. 204). As one reads these chilling remarks on a war that killed a whole generation of men on both sides, one is appalled by the lack of any humanity in the man who once ran the affairs of the United States of America from that White House which is, in fact, the blackest of all power houses on earth. But that is a topic for another time.
What is of importance in the present situation is an already-changed reality: since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran has made significant progress in all realms of its national life, not least in the areas of science and technology. During the last fifteen years, there has been a lot of investment in education, in the building of infrastructure, and in attaining a developmental capability beyond anyone’s estimates, through considerable diversification of national resources and wealth. This policy is now paying its dividends. The recent rise of men like Ahmadinejad, who can articulate the growing self-confidence of a country poised to become the most powerful nation in the Middle East, is merely one apparent sign of this changed reality.
Thus, it is not merely Iran’s progress in the fields of nuclear science and technology that is perceived as a threat by Europe and the United States, it is its overall rise and strength that is regarded as a threat to the Middle Eastern equation. It must be noted that, like all other things, this disturbance to the Middle East equation is not a sudden, one-time event; such things happen through small, incremental steps and during the last fifteen years, there have been many such small incremental steps. Slow, incremental disturbances are palpable, but now a threshold of sorts has arrived. It is this threshold which has created an impasse for the United States and Europe.
The easiest way for the United States and Europe to halt any further disturbance to the Middle Eastern equation is to cripple Iran through a direct attack, economic sanctions, or both. But that is not such an easy step; if it had been so, it would have been taken by now. Attacking Iran is not like attacking Iraq; there is much more at stake here and while the United States and Europe weigh their choices, Iranians are not unaware of their own options. They know that the best way out for them is to prevent any attack or sanctions, for no matter what happens on the battleground, the unavoidable consequence of any war would be a reversal of the progress made during the last fifteen years. No nation has unlimited resources; these resources are used either for nation building or for fighting a war. Thus, despite its current rhetorical stance, one hopes that the Iranian leadership is mature enough to understand this basic reality.
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