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The
decisive year
Dr
Muzaffar Iqbal
Sixteen
months later, the writing on the wall clearly shows a grand failure of the
first order on all seven counts. National morale is at its lowest, federation
is under tremendous pressure as more and more voices are being heard about provincial
autonomy and Punjabi-Sindhi differences have become a rallying point in the
background of the comparisons being made about the treatment meted out to a
Sindhi and a Punjabi prime minister.
As
for the revival of economy, the proverbial common man knows more than anyone
else what that means. The recent hike in petroleum prices not withstanding, the
economy has been going down at a steady pace.
The
fourth point on the General Musharraf's agenda was
law and order and speedy justice. Even if we attribute the recent series of
bomb blasts over Eid holidays to RAW, a simple count of the number of people
killed during the last sixteen months in terrorist acts would suffice to prove
that the fabric of Pakistani society is tearing apart.
The
fifth point was depoliticisation of state
institutions. A simple glance at the appointments made during the last sixteen
months would show that this agenda item should be read as: filling of state
institutions by serving and ex-military personnel.
The
sixth point on the list was the famous devolution of power to the grassroots
level and that is where he has kept his promise. The grand plan is unfolding
right in front of our eyes and the results of the recently held elections for
the local bodies are indicative of the direction in which the country is being
pushed. Even if we disregard the pathetic voter turn out, it is obvious that no
one is buying this sham democracy. The plan is flawed to the core and all it
can do is erect cardboard caricatures in the name of grassroots
democracy--caricatures which would crumble with the first blows of a mass
reaction.
But
perhaps nothing is more telling about the state of affairs during the last
sixteen months than what has been made of the last point on the agenda: the
promise of swift and across the board accountability.
The
mockery of accountability reached its peak in the deal made by the generals
with the man who was allowed to leave the country with 22 crates of his
possessions, including the prized stuffed lions. This was the final blow to all
hopes. Those
who have been pointing out basic flaws in the accountability process all along
could have been ignored had this sham not reached its limits in that
What
is most painful in this deal is that no court of law was consulted, no moral
principles were observed. What is more, the act was "legitimised"
by the state institutions after it had been accomplished. The hand-picked
ministers put their seal of approval on this mockery and the president signed
whatever was placed before him. What was achieved was a shattering blow to the
sanctity of institutions.
In
his address to the nation about the Nawaz Sharif affair, General Musharraf
seemed to be making a claim that God has appointed him to correct
All
these events make the year 2000 a decisive year for
Without institutions in which people have faith, the only alternative is
anarchy. A rapidly deteriorating economy, lack of any institutional support for
the emergence of a civil society and rule by decrees issued by a few
individuals are the most glaring realities of contemporary
This
ploy has often been used to gain short-term personal benefits. If they were
really serious in their programmes, these parties
would have established modern religious educational institutions from where a
new generation of religious scholars would have emerged with the requisite
qualifications for implementation of Islamic code of life in the contemporary
life. Instead of taking that positive road, all that the religious leadership
has done is create fear and hence alienation.
The
image of the gun-totting bearded youth has become synonymous with
implementation of Islam. This image, a far cry from Islamic teachings, has
taken a permanent position in the overall picture of contemporary
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Friday, January 19, 2001 -- Shawal 23,1421 |
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The
battle for Islam
Dr
Muzaffar Iqbal
Unless
the government enforces Islam by such and such date, we will march on to
Islamabad" is the usual rhetoric one hears in popular press these days.
But to be exact, this or similar rhetoric has been making headlines off and on
throughout Pakistan's existence as a sovereign state.
The
fact that no one takes these claims seriously is also an open secret. There is
always a last minute postponement of the march (as it happened again this past
Ramadan) and there is always a last minute reassurance by one or the other
minister which serves to save face for all concerned.
The
net result is that now no one takes these threats seriously--neither the
government, nor the masses nor those who make these claims. By now, everyone
has realised that behind these threats, there is
always another agenda. One recalls painfully the statement of retired General Naseerullah Babar, shortly after
the fall of Benazir's last government, about a
certain Maulana's visits to Islamabad. This Maulana was in the habit of making loud statements about
women's rule being against Islam. After a few public meetings, he would dash
off to Islamabad for a personal visit with BB who would pay him his price.
According to General Babar, one day he went to BB in
exasperation and told her to hand over the keys of the State Bank to the Maulana.
But
this is merely a side issue. The serious question for our deliberation is the
grand failure of Islamists in formulating a workable
plan for Islamisation of Pakistani society. In global
terms, this is a question that most Muslim countries face today. How is Islam
relevant in the contemporary world and how do we translate the vision of Islam
into a practical reality across the whole range of Muslim societies?
Let
us start with Pakistan. Historically speaking, Pakistan represents a unique
synthesis of the dynamic civilizational currents that
had flown into the subcontinent over more than a millennium. These currents
were the product of the interaction of the Islamic civilization with the local
Indian traditions. They gave birth to a new language (Urdu), transformed
existing languages such as Sindhi, Pashto and Baluchi and produced an intricate system of symbolism and
metrical rules for the expression of human emotions in these languages.
Thus
in the process of Islamisation of the subcontinent
over a long period of time, a natural process of cultural evolution produced a
new culture which was distinct from the Indian culture. This was an argument
used by Iqbal and subsequently by many other leaders for their demand of a
separated homeland for Muslims of the subcontinent.
The
ancient land routes that passed through this region served as an important
medium in the cultivation of a tradition that emerged from the rich and
enchanting world of Middle Eastern and South Asian folklore, legends, myths and
tales. This historical development is unique in many respects and can only be
understood in its proper context. Its uniqueness highlights the fact that the
cultural heritage of Pakistani people is not necessarily defined by the
geographical boundaries of the present day Pakistan.
Instead,
like the ideological basis of the state, the Pakistani culture reaches out to
its ancestral roots for its nourishment and growth. Its sources of inspiration
not only lie in the immediate surroundings but also in the geographically
remote regions from where it has incorporated a rich blend of Mesopotamian and
Mediterranean traditions.
As
the product of a dramatic encounter of major civilizations, Pakistan is a
unique experiment in world history. Its geographical setting is also as unique
as its cultural ethos: vast plains, deserts filled with glaring solitude and
snow-capped mountains enveloped with ice from the prehistoric times.
But
all of these marvelous facts about Pakistan have been overshadowed by a grand
failure which involves everyone: politicians, intellectuals, institutions and
religious groups. At the root of this grand failure lies the dilemma of
implementation of a plan that would produce that grand society which many
envisioned at the time of country's turbulent birth but which none could
translate into reality.
And
it is at this level that Pakistan's continuous struggle with the issue of Islamisation has a global element; the failure to translate
wide-spread emotional and spiritual yearnings of millions of Muslims into
viable and effective institutional structures is a dilemma faced by all
fifty-six Muslim States. There are many reasons for this. But to keep the
question in manageable proportions, let us concentrate on Pakistan for now.
Pakistan
came into existence through a movement that was dominated by personalities
rather than ideologies. This is not to belittle the fact that there were strong
ideological undercurrents in the independence movement. Iqbal had given an
eloquent expression to these underpinnings in his 1930 presidential address.
What is being said is simply this: at the time of country's independence, there
was no practical plan to translate these broad ideologies into reality.
No
one thought beyond the moment when a line would appear on the world map,
dividing India into two sovereign states. No one developed an institutional map
of the new country, no one charted the course of the new state or its polity.
Everyone involved in the Pakistan Movement was concerned with only one
question: independence. No doubt, it was a question of tremendous and fatal
proportion but had the Independence Movement been grounded in solid ideological
foundations, there would have been a group of thinkers and planners who would
have charted the course of events beyond August 14th, 1947.
In
the absence of a well thought out plan, the journey toward Pakistan became a
highly idealised and utopian journey. At the level of
masses, it was taken as a journey to the promised land. The underlying
assumption was that once we get the promised land, everything will be fine.
At
the level of political leadership, there was a similar trend and the whirlwind
of events that shook the Indian subcontinent between the end of second World
War and August 1947, totally obscured the practical realities of the
post-independence period.
As
a result, Pakistan came into existence in an atmosphere filled with utopian
hopes and idealism. But once the line had been drawn and the Indian
subcontinent had been partitioned, there arose a huge vacuum in the newly
independent state of Pakistan--a vacuum of tremendous proportions which
demanded a quick response. This was the vacuum created by the need for
establishment of state institutions which run contemporary nation states.
In
the absence of a pre-conceived and well-planned structure, this vacuum was
filled with the pre-Partition structures which quickly took over and having
re-established themselves in the new state, became the defining character of
the country whose ideological aspirations required a fundamentally different
institutional setup. This gave birth to an impasse which has not been resolved
during the last fifty-two years.
Thus,
at the heart of contemporary battle for Islam lies a historical reality which
needs to be seriously explored before any headway can be made.
But
that is only one aspect of the current dilemma. Another, and perhaps far more
serious dilemma lies in the fact that not a single religious party or group in
Pakistan has been able to present a practical plan for the establishment of an
Islamic state in the twenty-first century. This grand failure of Pakistan's
religious leadership requires a thorough analysis which will be looked into in
another article.
The
author is Regional Director for the Muslim World, CTNS and President, Centre for Islam and Science
Feb.2, 2001
Islam,
Pakistan and Muslims
Dr
Muzaffar Iqbal
On
August 14, 1947, when the state of Pakistan formally came into existence, there
were no blueprints or plans for the establishment of new institutions which
would be responsible for translating the grand vision of Islam into a practical
reality. There was not even a theoretical framework for such institutions.
The
state came into existence through a chaotic process that had reached its
enormously unmanageable pace during the few months leading up to the deadline
of August 14th. As a result of riots, massacres and mass movement of
population, the government of the nascent Republic of Pakistan was immediately
inundated by a task beyond its capacity. Millions of refugees were coming, each
with his or her tale of sorrow. The immediate task required emergency measures;
no one had time for anything but to look after the basic needs of food, shelter
and other provisions.
It
was somewhere in that initial phase of Pakistan's existence, that the ideal of
an Islamic State was lost. During those initial months, in the midst of
tremendous human sacrifices, there appeared the specter of land claims,
appropriation of properties left behind by Hindus and Sikhs and the vice of
greed that would make many into instant millionaires. Perhaps it was
inevitable.
The
time between 1940 and 1947 was the most precious time for the formulation of a
cohesive plan for the establishment of Islamic institutions in the new state.
But there was neither the leadership, nor the human resources needed to spell
out a clear plan for this process. The reasons are obvious. Those who were at
the forefront of political struggle, had neither the qualifications nor the
desire to establish an Islamic state. As a result of this situation, the
borderline that appeared on the world map on the 14th of August was merely a
physical border.
Contrary
to emotionally held belief, we must ascertain that Pakistan was not an
ideological state at birth, at least not in any concrete sense; it was merely a
state carved out on the basis of a vague but popular formulation of an ideal
which was never spelled out in concrete terms. At the level of masses, there
was the desire and tremendous sacrifices were made to establish an Islamic
state, but that was all there was. The greatest failure at that decisive time
lay in the nature and quality of religious education in the subcontinent. A
close look at these foundational problems would be helpful.
Organised Islamic education system in the Indian
subcontinent was introduced at a time when the golden age of learning had
already passed. One of the most influential curricula of Islamic education, the
famous Dars-e-Nizami, was issued by Mulla Nizam al-Din (d. 1747) of
the Firangi Mahal madrassa in Lucknow. This nine to
ten year syllabus of middle to higher education included sixteen different
subjects and eighty-four works in all. This curriculum included Arabic grammar
(12 works); rhetoric (3 works); prosody (1); logic (10 works); philosophy (4
works); Arabic literature (prose and poetry, 7 works); theology (5 works);
history of Islam (3 works); medicine (4 works); astronomy (2 works); geometry
(twenty chapters of Euclid); art of disputation (1); law (8); jurisprudence
(96); law of inheritance (1); principles of Hadith
(1); Hadith (10); principles of Qur'aan
interpretation (1) and four commentaries of the Qur'aan.
The
second syllabus of religious education was the one developed by Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (d. 1762). This leaned toward
traditional Islamic studies and included law, theology and Hadith
and surprisingly, Sufism. These two syllabi form the basis of practically all madrassa syllabi until today. Of course there are various
combinations and modifications but the core has remained the same with one
notable exception: the study of Hadith in the
subcontinent had received a new impulse thanks to the works of Abd al-Haqq of Delhi, who was to
be honored with the title of Muhadith. Under the
influence of Shah Wali Allah and his sons, Hadith literature received more importance.
The
scholars who descended from the school of Shah Wali
Allah, established the famous Deoband seminary in UP
in northern India in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In marked
contrast to this school of thought, there arose another school, located in the
town of Bareli and hence generally known as Barelvi school which emphasised
popular beliefs in the power of saints and mythification
of the Prophet of Islam. A third school that emerged in time was that of Ahl-e-Hadith.
Thus
at the time of establishment of Pakistan, there existed 137 madrassas
belonging to three dominate Sunni religious schools: the Deobandi,
the Ahl-e-Hadith and the Barelavi.
In addition, there were some Shia madrassas.
This number was to increase dramatically in the following decades, but without
any serious changes to the central core of the syllabi taught, with a few
notable exceptions, mostly based in big cities. The students who come out of
these madrassas have become a symbol in the form of Taliban of Afghanistan. And those elements in Pakistan who
dread them, never tire of raising the specter of Pakistani Taliban
but no one is particularly serious about looking at the deeper roots of this
phenomenon. Neither the government, nor the religious parties.
At
the root of emergence of Taliban, lies the
educational curricula which is characteristically static. Those who suffer this
curricula for ten to fifteen years of the most formative period of their lives,
cannot be expected to behave in any other way.
The
reality is simply this: Education remains the most neglected and most abused
area of Pakistan's state policies. In the recent decades, private educational
institutions of all kinds have sprung up, in response to market demand. This
situation arose through the failure of state educational system which remained
static and neglected throughout Pakistan's history.
With
the rise of private educational institutions, education has become a big business
in which the name of the game is money. A close look at what is being taught in
schools shows that in spite of Pakistan's avowed Islamic ideology, parents and
students gravitate toward those educational institutions that are established
on the western models. With few exceptions, only those students who cannot
afford to go to these new schools go to madrassas.
Madrassa education also remains a dead end. Those who come
out of madrassas can neither speak Arabic nor
English. Their knowledge of the contemporary world and its complexities is
often rudimentary and they cannot find jobs except in mosques and madrassas. For all practical purposes, they remain a
subclass of society. Their services are utilised on
occasions of marriage or death but they do not form the mainstream of urban
society -- people who go to offices and run state institutions.
This
brief sketch leads us to pose serious questions: Do Pakistanis really aspire to
become citizens of an Islamic state? Where are the scholars and institutions
that are required to establish an Islamic state in the twenty-first century? Is
there any real and substantive foundation on which the contemporary religious
leadership can demand implementation of Islam from the government?
The
author is Regional Director for the Muslim World, CTNS and President, Centre for Islam and Science
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Friday, February 16, 2001 -- Ziqa'ad 21,1421 |
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The
custodians of power
Dr
Muzaffar Iqbal
Politicians,
army, judiciary and the bureaucracy are the four custodians of power in the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Between them, they have appropriated the right to
rule over a population whose existence has always been in peril. But all four
institutions of state power now stand at a point where public confidence in
them is at its lowest ebb. In the absence of public trust and confidence,
institutions cannot hold any legitimate authority.
Among
the four, it is the politicians who share the burden of failure because it is
their failure that brought the other institutions into the high drama. But why
did the politicians fail and who are these people? Politics in Pakistan came
into the hands of landowners because they claimed to be the representatives of
people during the British Raj. Apart from Jinnah and a handful of his associates, the Muslim League
was nothing but nawabs and nawab
zadas. Thus, it was the zamindars
and waderas of the British Raj
who controlled the assemblies in the early years of Pakistan. They had emerged
on the power scene over centuries in a society where education was held back
from people and economic strength and brute force determined the claims to
power.
Nothing
changed with the creation of a separate state. Nothing could because soon after
the establishment of Pakistan, political leadership was involved in an
infighting which had nothing higher than petty interests at stake. After the
death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Khwaja
Nazimuddin became the Governor General with Liaqat Ali Khan as the prime minister. But Nazimuddin could not fit the role of Jinnah,
nor could he be the ceremonial head of the state that he should have been under
the parliamentary system of government. The infighting was centered around the
game of constitution making which was basically a struggle for control. The
Objectives Resolution had led to the creation of the Basic Principles Committee
(BPC) which was supposed to draft the constitution. But it could not.
This
failure brought a new player in the game: Pakistan's elite Civil Service, the
"Black Goras". The Civil Service of
Pakistan (CSP) had been chosen from among the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and it
consisted of people who ran state institutions on a day to day basis. In the
absence of a strong political leadership, these civil servants became
increasingly more powerful and eventually they became the kingmakers. The fate
of the country was sealed in October 1951 when Liaqat
Ali Khan was assassinated while addressing a public meeting in Rawalpindi. His assassin was instantaneously killed by a
police officer who was himself murdered several years later in what remains an
enigmatic case. Scotland Yard was brought in to assist in the investigation but
nothing was ever uncovered.
The
vacuum of political leadership thus created quickly brought in the third
player: the army. After Liaqat Ali's assassination, Nazimuddin, who was considered a weak and docile man from
Bengal quickly stepped down from the Governor Generalship to become the prime
minister while the finance minister, Ghulam Muhammad,
assumed the post of Governor General. Ghulam Muhammad
had no political constituency; he was not even a Leaguer. He was sick but his
ill-health did not deter him to strike at his enemies.
But
the biggest blunder was committed by Nazimuddin
himself. While addressing a public meeting in Dhaka, he carelessly announced
the intention of his government to declare Urdu the national language of
Pakistan. This was seen as the final coup de grace by the already feverish
Bengali population. Rioting broke out all over the city and the army had to be
brought in to stifle demonstrations. This was followed by riots in Karachi
where force was again needed.
But
this was just the beginning. The 1953 rioting in the wake of the Ahmadiya movement controversy engulfed the Punjab and
within a span of a few days the whole province was ablaze. Nazimuddin
had neither the ability, nor the backing to deal with this situation; the army
was again called but just when matters seemed to be resolving, Ghulam Mohammad dispatched the government of Nazimuddin in what became the first of several civil coups
in the history of Pakistan.
But
the worst was still to come. In the first provincial elections held in East
Pakistan, the Muslim League was dealt its death knell: it won a grand total of
10 seats as opposed to 223 seats by the combined opposition parties, the United
Front. But the United Front did not prove to be united when it came to harvest
the spoils and though Fazlul Haq
formed the government, he was never a leader.
Within
months, his government proved to be totally ineffective when rioting broke out
in and around Chittagong and in the industrial areas
south of Dhaka. Several non-Bengali managers were killed and Ghulam Muhammad found it convenient to sack the government
of Fazlul Haq. This time,
the army received its first official seal of approval: Martial law was imposed
and Iskander Mirza, a
former Army officer, political agent in the Frontier Province and Pakistan's
first Defence Secretary, became the ruler of East
Pakistan.
The
fourth player in Pakistan's power politics, the judiciary, was brought in when
the other three brought the whole state to a standstill. This is how this drama
unfolded: By now, the central administration of the country had been seized by
the bureaucrats and through Ghulam Muhammad's
leadership, they had become organized to rule the country. Muhammad Ali Bogra had succeeded Nazimuddin as
Prime Minister but the real power remained in the hands of Ghulam
Muhammad and his technocrats.
A
plan was devised by the Muslim leaguers to pass a series of enactments in the
Constituents Assembly (which also substituted for the National Assembly), to
limit the powers of the Governor-General. Ghulam
Muhammad was not the one to suffer such tactics, he joined hands with General
Muhammad Ayub Khan, the commander-in-chief of the
Pakistan Army and dissolved the Constituent Assembly. It was the beginning of
the end: the country would henceforth be ruled through executive orders. This
also gave chance to the fourth player to step in. The decision was challenged
and the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the dissolution of the Assembly and
sealed the fate of the nascent democracy.
Then
Ghulam Muhammad had a stroke and Iskander
Mirza returned from his eastern sojourn, ready to
take charge. The die had been cast. The second Constitution Assembly was
elected, even a constitution was adopted but between 1956 and the autumn of
1958, Pakistan's state system collapsed from a decade of incessant fighting and
the grand vision of the country was pushed under the blanket of a nightmare
which imposed one man's rule over the entire populace.
In
October 1958, when General Ayub Khan brought the
curtain down on Pakistan's short-lived affair with democracy, he not only
abrogated the Constitution and banished Mirza, he
also enacted the last Act of the tragic drama in which the final words would be
spoken by one of his successors in Khaki on another October day. But between
these two Octobers, lie ashes of hopes and dreams of millions of men and women,
whose suffering and sacrifices will remain unsung.
The
author is the President of the Centre for Islam and
Science
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Friday, March 02, 2001 -- ZilHaj 06,1421 |
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The
spirit of sacrifice
Dr
Muzaffar Iqbal
Once
again the pilgrims are gathering in the inviolable city of Makkah. Once again,
more than two million human beings are preparing to stand before their Lord on
the Day of Arafah in response to an invitation which
has been extended to all of us: "And proclaim unto all people, the
Pilgrimage: they will come unto thee on foot and on every (kind of) fast mount,
coming from every faraway point (on earth)."
The
Haj is the oldest continuous rite in the human
history. It celebrates the covenant which God established with his chosen
friend, Ibrahim (may Allah's blessings be upon him),
the one whom Allah honoured with intimate
communication and called him Hanif and Khalil. He commanded Ibrahim to
build a house of worship and to keep it pure for those who stand, bend and
prostrate and He told Ibrahim to proclaim Haj and told him that people will come to the house from
far and near, on foot and on lean camels so that they may benefit and remember
Allah.
Ibrahim (may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him)
obeyed his Lord and built the house. Then he left his son and wife near the
house and thus prayed: "O my Lord: May this city be city of peace and
security and preserve me and my offsprings from
serving idols. My Lord, these idols have indeed led astray many among mankind.
O my Lord! I have made some of my offspring to dwell in a valley without
cultivation, by the sacred house, in order, My Lord, that they may establish
regular prayer. So fill the hearts of some among men with love towards them and
feed them with fruits so that they may give thanks."
"O
Lord, truly you know what we conceal and what we reveal for nothing is hidden
from Allah, whether on earth or in heaven. Praise be to Allah, who granted me
in old age Ismai'l and Ishaq,
truly my Lord is He, the Hearer of prayer.
"O
my Lord! make me and my offspring steadfast in prayer. O my Lord! accept my
prayer and cover me and my parents and all believers with thy forgiveness on
the Day of Reckoning."
Hundreds
of years after these events, thousands of Muslims are once again gathering in
the blessed city. They will follow the rites of Haj,
just as these have been followed for centuries. They will remember the Sa'i of Ismail's mother (may
Allah bless her) when she ran between al-Safa and al-Marwah and praise and thank Allah for Zamzam
which flew out of a barren ground.
Ibrahim (pbuh) was prepared for
the supreme test that his Lord had reserved for him so that He may leave it as
a sign and a lesson for generations to come. When he received a vision
regarding this ultimate test of his loyalty and steadfastness, he said to his
son: "O my son! I see, in a vision, that I offer thee in sacrifice. Now
see what is thy view!"
The
son said: "O my father, Do as thou art commanded, Thou will find me, if
God wills, among those who are steadfast."
When
they had both submitted their wills Ibrahim (SA) had
laid his son prostrate on his forehead, Allah called out to Ibrahim:
"O
Ibrahim! Thou has already fulfilled the vision! Thus
indeed We reward those who do right. For this was a trial and We ransomed him
with a momentous sacrifice. And We left this blessing for him among generations
to come in later times. Peace and Salutation to Ibrahim."
The
pilgrims will remember this supreme act of faith and, following the rites, will
sacrifice after the day of Arafah. They will be
joined in this action by millions of other Muslims all around the world. But
beyond these rituals, the Haj has another, much
deeper, significance. It presents a unique opportunity of an inner
transformation of the human soul, an opportunity to turn toward God, to realign
oneself and to re-establish the primordial covenant.
The
Haj also has a historical significance for it was on
the day of Arafah, that the Prophet of Islam had
delivered that historic sermon which had proclaimed that all humans are equal.
On that day, the Prophet (may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him) was
mounted on his camel as he proceeded to the Mount of Arafah;
he was followed by all the pilgrims. On the east side of the mountain, at a
spot called Namirah, he pitched his tent and stayed
there until the sun passed the zenith. Then he rode his camel until he reached
the valley of Uranah. There, sitting on his camel, he
had addressed his companions:
"O
people, listen well to my words for I do not know whether I shall meet you
again on such an occasion in the future. O people, your lives and your property
shall be inviolate until you meet your Lord. The safety of your lives and of
your property shall be inviolate as this holy day and holy month. Remember that
you will indeed meet your Lord, and that He will indeed reckon your deeds. Thus
do I warn you. Whoever of you is keeping a trust of someone else shall return
that trust to its rightful owner. All interest obligations shall henceforth be
waived. Your capital, however, is yours to keep. You will neither inflict nor
suffer inequity. God has judged that there shall be no interest and that all
the interest due to Abbas ibn
Abdal Muttalib shall
henceforth be waived. Every right arising out of homicide in pre-Islamic days
is henceforth waived. And the first such right that I waive is that arising from
the murder of Rabiah ibn al
Harith ibn Abd al Muttalib.
O
people, today the claims of Shaitaan for ever being
worshipped in this land of yours have been reduced to naught. Nevertheless he
is still anxious to determine the lesser of your deeds. Beware of him,
therefore, for the safety of your Din....
O
people! I have conveyed to you Allah's message. Those who are present should
convey this message to those who are not present..."
Then
the prophet (may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him) asked people to bear
witness that he has indeed conveyed to them the message he received and all
through the great steppe, people said in unison: "Indeed so!" "O
Allah," said the Prophet, "be witness."
After
this historical sermon, the prophet (may Allah's peace and blessings be upon
him) dismounted and waited until mid-afternoon, at which time he performed both
the Zohar and the Asr
prayers. He then mounted his camel and proceeded to al Sakharat
where he recited to the people the following Divine revelation which had been
just received: "Today I have completed for you your Din and granted you
the last of my blessings. Today I have chosen Islam as your Din."
The
author is the President, Centre for Islam and Science
http://www.jang-group.com/thenews/
Friday,
March 16, 2001 -- ZilHaj 20,1421 A.H
Man
in the dock
Dr
Muzaffar Iqbal
Strange
things happen in our land. But none is stranger than the persistence of a
pattern that repeats itself, ruler after ruler. In a land where stability is as
scarce as water, it is indeed strange to see this pattern of delusion chasing
every ruler.
The
broad outline of this pattern can be sketched in a few words: Following a few
dramatic events, a face emerges on the national TV and solemnly announces the
grave situation which had forced him to assume powers of this unfortunate land.
He summarises the grand failures of his predecessors
along with a long list of their corruption and inefficiency. Then he goes on to
promise a miracle: he has decided to overhaul the whole system and root out
corruption. In this task, he needs all the help he can get from his nation.
This marks the first phase of a new rule.
For
a few weeks, there is the struggle of legitimising
the rule. Those who oppose it on various grounds are either silenced or their
voices are drowned in the rush of new events. The opposition, if there happens
to be any, is targeted and a number of cases are launched to keep them busy. To
be sure, there is always a court case about the new setup but none of this
bothers the new ruler because he is the ruler, ipso facto and no matter what is
said, the down to earth reality is that he is there, with all his might. He has
carved a place for himself and none can turn the clock back.
Often
the new ruler is welcomed by the nation for it had become sick and tired of its
previous ruler; everyone needs a change. But this new romance between the ruler
and the nation does not last; the spring is always short and soon the promises
of the new ruler, his grand plans and the possibility of a miraculous
transformation start to lose luster. The hard realities of water shortage,
price hikes and the daily hardships start to make their presence felt with
increasing force.
By
now the new ruler has firmly established himself. He has surrounded himself
with people who become his spokesmen. He is not alone any more. He has a score
of new ministers and advisors who become their master's voice and the initial
chorus of reform, transformation and miraculous recovery achieves a grand new
dimension: within the first six months of the new rule, an amazing number of
new reforms and new policies are announced. Each new minister comes with his
plans and promises to deliver goods that would transform Pakistan.
This
phase of the new rule ushers the ruler into a comfort zone. There are the
foreign trips, these visits bring much needed distraction and each trip adds to
the chorus of reform by promising foreign investment and successes at nebulous
international fronts. By now, some of the ministers also start to announce
their own successes in laying the foundations of a new era in the nation's life.
These are quick results that are supposed to have been achieved by them in a
short time because of their genius. These often include some real projects
which were actually started by their predecessors a few years previous to his
rule but they happen to be completed just when the new minister took over.
Hence he feels perfectly justified in taking credit.
But
generally speaking, these successes are often virtual; they only exist in some
nebulous realm of cyber space. Such successes often include hundreds of new
schools, roads, provision of electricity, virtual IT universities and the like.
Increasingly, this phase of the rule of the new ruler has attained a degree of
sophistication in credit claims. There has been a trend in the recent years to
use numbers beyond anyone's comprehension. These numbers often tell the story
of GDP growth and other economic factors that allude to the prosperity of the
nation. This phase can be called the summer of the new ruler for it is
accompanied by a lot of sound and fury and of course, sweat. The summer of the
new rule is also the time when the disillusionment of the nation starts to
become obvious. In spite of the grand chorus of success, in spite of the new
policies and new plans, the nation lives in the same old bleak and hopeless
state as before the commencement of the new rule. There is the same daily doze
of terrorist attacks, late trains, scarcity of water, daily suffering
associated with pollution, the same corruption, the same pain.
The
new ruler knows all this. But by now, he has become very confident and
invariably, a sacrosanct element is now added to his speeches: none other than
the Almighty had brought him to power and he has a mission to accomplish. Of
course there are those who do not see this Divine wisdom but he is not to be
deterred by such short-sighted people. He has convinced himself that he was,
indeed, chosen by God Almighty to take this nation out of its crisis. A few Umrah trips and a Hajj (on state expenses) further
reinforce this conviction.
But
sadly, this over confidence produces a veil of deception which removes the
ruler from everyday realities and although he increasingly talks about his
divinely ordained mission, he fails to see that the autumn of his rule has
arrived. In the autumn of his rule, the rulers complain about the press and the
daily reports; some even try to stifle the dissident voices, more benevolent
one's merely state their displeasure but they all fail to see the writing on
the wall.
This
is the most dangerous time for the ruler and history shows that none of our
rulers have been able to see their autumn. Ayub Khan
was celebrating the tenth anniversary of his rule and the green revolution when
his autumn was in full view, ZA Bhutto was oblivious
to his impending fall and the recent memory of the two rules of BB and Nawaz Sharif supply ample
evidence to their blindness to their failures. Now, the autumn of our honorable
CE has also arrived. All the signs are appearing once more. While he believes
that he has turned the tide, the print media keeps depicting another picture.
In his recent address at the 16th annual lunch of the Council of Pakistan
Newspaper Editors (CPNE), he complained about negative reporting and demoralisation. "The looking-glass that we see every
morning does not reflect the reality, and the mirror sometimes reflects uncrystalised, pessimistic and one-sided view. That is what
bothers me as a Pakistani, and not head of the government.''
Clearly,
our beloved CE does not see the reality that 156 million Pakistanis see
everyday. But never mind. The desire of the honorable CE is that henceforth the
killing of the innocent namazis should not occupy the
front pages of our print media. But he did not specify what shall be befitting
in such circumstances. Would his desire be that the print media help to cheer
up the nation by placing a picture of a smiling child beside the details of the
gory act?
In
this repetition of the scene, each autumn brings more despair. Since the
present government came to power, the law and order situation has not improved,
the disparity between the rich and the poor has been increasing and the
proverbial common man is finding it harder and harder to make ends meet. And
yet, our honorable CE would have us believe that he has turned the tide!
The
writer is the President of Center for Islam and Science (CIS)
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Friday, March 30, 2001 -- Moharram Ul Harram 04,1422 A.H |
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Need
of the hour
Dr
Muzaffar Iqbal
Against
all historical evidence, let us assume that General Musharraf
really means what he has said repeatedly regarding the deadline set by the Supreme
Court for holding general elections before October 2002. What would be Pakistan
like after the elections? Would the new political set up make any difference?
Would these elections prove to be a real turning point in Pakistan's history?
Or would it be just change of faces leading to another military takeover?
It
is not hard to discern that both BB and Nawaz Sharif would not be candidates in elections to be held in
2002. Their disqualification means that their parties would be led by others.
It is also a foregone conclusion that if their parties win elections, they
would bounce back on to the national scene and all charges against them would
vanish in thin air.
But
this is unlikely to happen. General Musharraf would
need to block their way, it is essential for his own survival in the
post-election era. But how would he ensure this? He would have to come up with
some drastic changes in the constitution or modalities of elections. On this,
the government has not revealed any plans so far. But something is bound to
come up within the next few months. The main question for the government is how
to achieve this without invalidating the whole process of democratisation.
However,
more important for the future of the country is the level of preparedness of
the political parties. Unfortunately, so far not a single party has shown any
level of preparedness. This reflects the lack of grounding of the political
process in Pakistan. In true democratic systems, political parties have
standing policies on national affairs. In Pakistan, there exists neither a
political culture, nor political parties in the real sense of the words. All we
have is person-oriented politics that plays havoc with the lives of millions of
people. In order to evolve positive and sustainable political order, someone
needs to take lead and force major political parties into doing their home work
before the next elections. Media can do this in the most constructive manner.
The road map to a new political setup can also benefit from this exercise.
In
case this challenge is taken up by the media, it can become a major turning
point in Pakistan's history. What is needed is not so complex. There are very
basic and obvious national problems that can be divided into various categories
such as economy, educational system, foreign policy and the like.
What
is needed is a two step process. The first step involves formulation of basic
problems of the country in very clear terms. This formulation is needed to
present a clear picture of where we stand. Each area of national concern needs
to be studied by a team of experts in that particular area. For example, a team
of independent economists can be assembled and given the task of presenting to
the nation a true picture of Pakistan's economy. There are hundreds of Pakistanis
in and outside Pakistan who would gladly join such a team if there is a
foundation, institution or even a newspaper group that wants to initiate this
process.
Likewise,
a team of educators can come up with a white paper on the sad state of Pakistan's
educational system. But in order to build a new social and political order, the
focus of this work has to be on constructive and objective assessment of the
present situation rather than on putting blame on various institutions.
Once
a range of basic problems has been clearly defined and stated, the foundation,
institution or the newspaper group in charge of this exercise can then place
these national issues before various political parties and ask them to come up
with comprehensive strategies for solving these problems. Each party should be
required to deal with the specifics, rather than generalities of the problems.
This would achieve an immediate positive result; instead of a repetition of
previous elections based on personality cults. Elections 2002 would become an
issue oriented election in which people can vote on the basis of soundness of
the solutions presented by political parties. This is a massive exercise in
public education. This is also an approach that has the potential of
establishing a truly solid foundation for the future of Pakistan.
Once
the issues are framed, problems are stated in statistical terms, a clear
picture of Pakistani society would emerge. On the basis of familiarity with the
problems, one can easily say that these problems cannot be solved in a short
time. Hence, what would be needed is a long-term map, with a short-term
strategic plan. Each contesting party should be asked to develop these long and
short-term plans in each of the major areas.
Thus
people would know what a certain party intends to do for specific problems such
as education, health, etc. This would also force political parties to form
small teams of their own in each area of national importance and come up with
plans that can be debated and discussed within their own membership. If carried
out with the right spirit and in a proper way, this exercise would also produce
national consensus on major issues. Out of various possible solutions of each
problem, one or two would emerge as more suitable. By the tend of this process,
the nation would have achieved two things.
It
would know where it stands and where it is heading and it would know who among
the contesting parties has a road map for their future. The new government
would also benefit from this exercise. Even before coming to power, it would
have devised its policies and methodologies. This is particularly beneficial in
a society where coming to power immediately cuts connections with the
grassroots. There is not much time left. If our initial assumption is right,
and if elections to be held in year 2002 are to produce any significant change,
it is high time that such an exercise is undertaken. Are there any NGOs out
there who would like to take up this challenge? Are there any institutions
(including the print media) that is interested in this nation-building
exercise?
There
are thousands of overseas Pakistanis who would like to do something for their
country. Can they come forward and initiate the process by setting up a
Foundation for Reconstruction of Pakistan? If the government is sincere in its
plans and if there is a real will to bring about a major transformation of the
society, government can also initiate this effort by forming a national
reconstruction bureau which is totally independent and which has access to all
the information needed to lay the foundations of such an effort.
The
writer is the President of Center for Islam and Science (CIS)
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Friday, April 13, 2001 -- Moharram Ul Harram 18, 1422 A.H |
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Role
of religious parties
Dr
Muzaffar Iqbal
The
late Dr MA Kazi liked to narrate episodes of his life
from the time when he was Advisor to General Ziaul Haq on science and technology. On one occasion, he told a
story that runs like this: General Ziaul Haq had a series of meetings with the religious leaders. To
each one of them, he expressed his desire to enforce Islam and asked the way to
do so. As usual, he posed himself as a very humble man who had good intentions
but who lacked the wisdom to accomplish the task.
The
venerable religious leaders were his guides and he wanted to get their guidance
in this noble task. At the end of the series of meetings, he gathered them all
and tried to evolve a working plan. The religious leaders of Pakistan could not
agree on a common plan. They could not even pray together in the presidency
behind one Imam. Each sect had their own Imam and their own plan. At the end of
the exercise, the General gathered his inner circle in one of those
post-midnight gatherings that used to keep him protected from the bouts of
insomnia. And he told them all that had happened. He laughed in a mixture of
happiness and despair. The religious leadership had no plan. They had no idea
of how to implement Islam although they had been clamouring
for it for the last forty years. Dr Kazi was part of
that inner circle and the General had developed a liking for him. On this
occasion, Dr Kazi said to the General, "Sir I
have a plan."
"What
is your plan?" asked the General. "Sir, I am a scientist. I like to
do control experiments. I suggest that before implementing Islam in the whole
country, you establish an Islamic city as a model. That would help us to
understand the practical difficulties which would arise." According to Dr Kazi, the General laughed at this idea and changed the
conversation. That was an indication for his inner circle that Dr Kazi had taken the matter too seriously and that the
General was only interested in mocking the religious elite of the country. But
lately, I have been thinking about the suggestion of late Dr MA Kazi. If one really thinks about the merits of this
suggestion, the idea is extremely valuable. If Pakistan is really interested in
becoming an Islamic country, it should first experiment with the establishment
of a truly Islamic city. The road to Islamisation of
the whole system is neither easy nor clear.
Our
economic, educational and state systems are based on secular models and without
a major revolution, there is no possibility of changing their foundational
principles. Such a revolution is not in sight. Like the mainstream political
parties, Pakistan's religious parties have no plan, no concrete methodology and
no substantial in-house study of the ways to implement Islam. Like all the
other political parties, all they want is power and assure us that once in
power, they will be able to enforce Islam. But time has run out for such empty
promises. No one believes it any more. Pakistan's religious parties are deeply
entrenched in a sectarian divide. They all have their narrow definitions of
Islam. They do not pray together; they do not agree upon a unified plan and
they are ill-equipped to deal with contemporary complex realities. Yet all of
them never tire of demanding the enforcement of Islam.
They
never tire of castigating others and passing verdicts against all who disagree
with them. Given the unifying aspects of Islam, the universality of the Qur'aan and Sunnah, it is most
surprising that the religious parties cannot form a unified stand on the
process of Islamisation. Instead of the grand vision
of Islam, they are stuck with minor details and their dogmatic positions have marginalised their own role in national affairs. If there
is going to be a major change in the country, it has to come through solid
planning and sustained efforts.
If
the religious parties wish to have any say in national affairs, they have to
first start an in-house process of building models and strategies. This
requires that teams of Islamic scholars work together on specific issues and
evolve effective methodologies that would lead to the emergence of new
institutions based on Islamic teachings. A model Islamic city can be a good
start. Such a city can come into existence by implementing the model in one of
the cities now existing or by founding a new city. Just like Islamabad was
established as a brand new city with a master plan, one can think of a new
Islamic city with a master plan. Such a city would have to be located within
the boundaries of Pakistan but it can given a special status by completing the
required legal formalities.
What
would be the essential features of an Islamic model city? What could life be
like in a city that runs on Islamic principles? Apart from its outward
manifestations, such as the abundance of mosques, what would be the major
features that would distinguish it from any other city? What would its
financial institutions be like? What would be taught in its schools? How would
the courts function in this city? What would be the role of women in this city?
Let us imagine that this idea is taken seriously and with sincerity. Would
there be peace and harmony among all sects in our model Islamic city? Would
they be willing to live and let live? Would they be able to devote their
energies toward the establishment of the Qur'aan and
the Sunnah?
These
are serious questions and challenges for the religious parties. Time has come
for them to do something more than the empty rhetoric and demands for the
enforcement of Islam. Everyone knows that there is much more to the enforcement
of Islam than mere demands. If Islam is really the ideal and the desired goal
of Pakistanis, there is a need to devise a strategic plan that would work. Such
a plan will not come from the mainstream political parties; they neither have
the desire nor the means to evolve it. It has to come from the religious
leadership. But is Pakistan's religious leadership equipped to draw up such a
plan? Are there enough religious scholars who understand the dynamics of
contemporary statecraft and who have the necessary intellectual and academic
resources to translate the vision of Islam to a twenty-first century city?
A
simple glance at the structure and working of the existing religious parties is
enough to provide a negative answer. None of the existing religious parties is
based upon a manifesto that outlines positive approach to the stated goal of Islamisation. They have never developed solid plans in any
area of national life. They do not have teams of experts who can come up with
working models of educational, economic, judicial and other institutions. The
most likely party that can make the leap required to meet the needs is Jamaat-e-Islami. But since the death of its founder, it has
not found a leader who has the vision to formulate a practical strategy. Its
politics remains that of negative reactions, demands and threats.
It
is considered to be one of the most organised parties
in the country, yet it has not used its considerable organisational
structure for the development of model institutions that can prove to the
masses that if they vote for the Jamaat, it would
deliver. The path of a constructive role for the religious parties in national
affairs remains a deserted road, the journey has not even begun.
The
writer is the President of Center for Islam and Science
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Friday, May 04, 2001-- Safar 09,1422 A.H |
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Second
wave of colonisation
Dr
Muzaffar Iqbal
Out
of one billion Muslims now living on planet earth, only some 15 per cent are
Arabs. The rest do not speak Arabic, though all practicing Muslims have some
ability to read the Qur'aan in Arabic original, often
without understanding it. This simple fact can be taken as a starting point in
an understanding of dilemmas and challenges faced by contemporary Muslims.
Spread in a geographical region that is by far the most underdeveloped part of
the globe, contemporary Muslims are neither a dominant voice in the
international affairs nor an economic power, though among them are some of the
world's richest countries. In spite of this bleak picture, Islam as the fastest
growing religion in the world and Muslim presence looms large in world media.
The
challenges faced by Muslims today are unique; there has never been a time in
their history that has presented such threats. In a world that is rapidly
moving towards globalisation of economic activity,
Muslim societies are in fact faced with the threat of extinction as distinct
cultural and economic entities. For all practical purposes, these threats
constitute a second colonisation.
As
a matter of fact, this second colonisation of the
Muslim world is already well underway. From Africa to the Malayan archipelago,
Muslim cities and societies are rapidly losing that distinct characteristic
that has remained their outward mark for centuries. This characteristic mark
emerges from a grand synthesis of cultural and religious manifestations of
Islamic civilisation. It makes its presence felt at
various levels: from the sound of the call for prayer to the most mundane
affairs of everyday life. It is present in the fragrance of a freshly baked
bread in a clay oven just as it is present in the aroma of spices.
With
the spread of this second wave of colonisation,
Muslim societies are rapidly emulating western models. Their ideals are based
on a lifestyle and culture that is not their own. If the rate of new colonisation remains unchecked, these societies will soon
lose all that makes them distinct. The force that propels this new wave of colonisation is economics and technology is its vehicle and
means.
Except
for a handful of states, all Muslim countries are crippled in an economic
sense. They are heavily shackled in chains that grow thicker every day. This
debt trap (or shall we say death trap) is wrapped around their necks with the
help of corrupt rulers, direct and indirect intervention and through aid programmes that foster dependence and long-term disability
of local institutions. IMF and the World Bank remain the chief institutional
support for this new colonisation.
In
real terms, no Muslim country has actually gained independence; before leaving
physically, the colonising powers made sure that
their interests would be protected and for all practical purposes, the struggle
for independence only produced a change of rulers. The effective mechanisms
left behind by the departing colonisers worked and
ensured their continued presence, dominance and control.
But
the most distressing part of the second wave of colonisation
is the fact Muslims are embracing this second colonisation
willingly and whole-heartedly. There is hardly any resistance to this process.
In many countries, the arrival of an IMF team is welcomed in more or less the
same manner as the old viceroys were treated in the colonies. The economic
packages sought by Muslim governments are actually welcomed and considered to
be a sign of success for the government.
No
doubt these bailouts provide a short-term relief for the government in power
but in reality, they just add more weight to the chains. In the end, the
country loses its ability to make its own decisions even on matters such as gas
and electricity tariffs. This neo-colonial economic trap is now firmly wrapped
around the necks of all Muslim countries except for a handful of oil-rich
states. But those countries have shackles of a different kind.
Soon
after their independence, the oil-rich countries had to fight for their rights
to control their own mineral resources. After a decade or so of intense
struggle, when they finally won the battles, they found out that they have
neither the technological resources, nor the manpower to run the operations and
they went back to the western multinational corporations for joint drilling and
exploration agreements. In the end, they had to settle for a share rather than
the complete rights in their own God-given wealth! Hence instead of direct
control by foreign governments, revenues from the oil and gas reserves are now
being shared by the Muslim countries with western multinationals.
No
doubt, this influx of new money has created an unprecedented affluence in these
countries but just because of that sudden windfall, these societies have lost
their moorings and traditional lifestyles have disappeared within the course of
one generation. In addition to economic colonisation,
the Muslim world is rapidly coming under what may be called technological colonisation.
This
new form of colonisation knows no borders. It is
capable of penetrating the remotest corners of the globe and its reach is
eradicating traditional societies just as effectively as is being done in big
cities. I recall with painful memories the destruction of peace and tranquility
of the idyllic Kareemabad, nestled as it is among
some of the highest mountain peaks in the world. Until the late 1980s it was a
place where life came to a gradual standstill by sunset and all that remained
after dark were the silently moving stars in the stillness that reminded one of
primordial peace and calm. It was a place where a steady stream of tourists
came silently and where the spirit experienced an exaltation of the most
profound kind. But within the last decade, the place has been transformed
through technological penetration. Now this remote village is filled with dish
antennas, the harsh noise of generators, motorbikes and the activities related
to the construction of modern hotels. The silence is no more.
This
is just one example. One can cite hundreds of others, ranging from the much
advertised sun-beaches and desert resorts of UAE to the newly established
coastal resorts of Brunei, which is ironically named Dar-essalam.
All of these places have transformed through aspirations of emulating the
western lifestyle. This deep-rooted mental colonisation
not only manifests itself in the rapid destruction of traditional lifestyles;
it is also accompanied by the erosion of values, arts and crafts and hundreds
of other outward signs of Islamic cultures which evolved over a millennium.
The
fundamental unit of the traditional Muslim societies was the family. At this
level, these societies were organised in a manner
that made the process of aging a graceful realisation
of one's potentials. One moved up the scale, so to speak, as one grew older.
With age, one's social position elevated and if one happened to be a craft
person, age not only brought maturity in one's profession, it also brought honours and responsibility of passing on the trade to the
next generation. The new economic colonisation has
made all traditional crafts out of place. As a result, Muslim families which
had inherited the traditional crafts, have lost their place in the over all
scheme of things and they have either become distinct or are on their way out.
The dying of these crafts is silently eradicating a rich layer of Islamic art.
These
are some of the transforming currents of the second wave of colonisation
being faced by Muslim societies. In the next column, we will explore other
facets of this development.
May
18, 2001 ????
The
colonial cut
Dr
Muzaffar Iqbal
In
the previous "Quantum Note" (The News, May 4, 2001), I had presented
the idea that the Muslim world is now under the second wave of colonisation. Mention was made of some of the transforming
currents that accompany the second wave of colonisation.
In this, I wish to explore how Muslims succumbed to this process of colonisation.
The
first thing to note is that it was during the period of the first colonisation that the West encountered Islam and Muslims in
Dar al-Islam for the first time in history in a situation in which it had an
unquestionable material superiority. This period was contemporaneous with
certain scientific and technological developments in the West which were used
to subjugate a vast territory and people who had never before lived under such
degrading conditions. But the roots of this development go back to the European
Renaissance that opened a vast, hitherto uncharted territory for the emergence
of a civilisation which was to dominate the rest of
the world in the coming centuries.
Ironically,
the last flowering of Islamic civilisation prior to colonisation overlapped with the emergence of the early
fruits of a new spirit in Europe but the two had no contact with each other
except for some isolated travel accounts which were not taken seriously in
Europe. Ibn al-Baytar (1200-1248), Nasir al-Din (1201-1274) and Roger Bacon (1214-1294) were
contemporaries, and so were Jalal al-Din Rumi (d 1273) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Hafiz
(1320-1389) was born one year before Dante Alighieri's
death and seven years before Meister Eckhart's death
in 1327. Another important aspect of the relationship between the two sides at
this time is the fact that whatever was being produced in the Muslim world was
really the dwindling melody of a music soon to fade away, whereas Europe was
awakening to embrace a revolutionary period. So while modern universities were
being founded at Pisa (1338), Grenoble (1339) and
Oxford (1340), most of the Muslim world was in the grip of a medieval madrassah system that had lost all vitality.
In
1453, when the Ottomans captured Constantinople after overpowering Emperor
Constantine XI, Johann Gutenberg (c 1396-1468) was
busy printing his 42-line (Mazarin) Bible at Mainz,
using metal plates. Although printing was introduced into the Ottoman Empire
during the reign of Bayezid II (1481-1512), its use
remained mainly in the hands of Christians and Jews and its influence on the
society was hardly worth mentioning compared to what this invention did for
Europe. Within fifty years of the invention of printing press in Europe, a full
grown book industry had emerged with three distinct professions: the type founder,
the printer and the bookseller. By 1501, more than 1,000 printing presses had
produced approximately 35,000 titles with approximately 10 million copies.
The
Mogul and Persian empires remained uninterested in this important invention for
almost four more centuries. We should also note that all important scientific
discoveries and inventions (which were to play an important role in redefining
the nature of relationship between Muslims and the West in subsequent
centuries) occurred in Europe and not in the Muslim lands in spite of the
Persian, Mogul and Ottoman Empires having control over vast lands and
resources.
Some
scholars have attributed the lack of scientific developments in the Muslim
societies to the internal wars of the ruling elite which supposedly did not
allow them to patronise discoverers and inventors.
However, a close look at the European history of this period reveals that
Europe was not free from internal strife. In 1521, Edward Stafford, Duke of
Buckingham and potential claimant to the English throne was executed by the
order of Henry VIII; three years later, the French were driven out of Italy; in
1525 German and Spanish forces joined to defeat French and Swiss at Pavia; in 1527 Rome was sacked; imperial troops pillaged
the city, killing 4,000 inhabitants; in the same year Pope Clement VII was
imprisoned in Castel Sant
Angelo. Likewise in 1531 there was war between Protestant Zurich and Catholic
Cantons; in 1536 Queen Anne Boleyn was sent to the
Tower of London and executed, and the list goes on.
Towards
the end of the fifteenth century, navigating into the uncharted seas, European travellers, supported by rulers, started to discover new
routes, lands and riches which generated the earliest impulses for colonisation. Soon missionaries were on the march,
reversing the roles between Muslims and the West. Emperor Akbar
(1542-1605) was born in the same year in which St Francis Xavier arrived at Goa as a Jesuit missionary. Akbar
lived to rule the Mogul Empire at its zenith but failed to perceive the dangers
inherent in the advances of the West.
The
period of first colonisation also coincided with an
important development within the Muslim world. The worldwide Muslim societies,
which had come into existence by the eighteenth century, were at the brink of
devastation. Surrender of Baghdad which was the capital and seat of the
Caliphate from 750 to 1258 had ended the centralised
nature of Muslim rule. Prior to 1258, Muslim societies had been built around a
central ideological framework. The concept of ummah,
the community of believers, rather than that of state, held a prime position in
this framework. The unifying factors were the common belief in the oneness of
God and common practices such as prayers, fasting and pilgrimage. Within this
framework, there was considerable divergence and a cosmopolitan society had
emerged. But the period of large empires, ruled by single families, was coming
to an end. The great imperial and state-systems, which had established
themselves in the late medieval era, were showing signs of inner weakness
though these had yet to take an outward form.
At
the dawn of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire still controlled much of
the Balkan Peninsula, most of the Mediterranean coast of Africa and virtually
all of the Arab lands in the eastern Mediterranean basin. The Mogul empire
continued to be the largest political unit in South Asia and the Safavid Empire ruled Persia. Outside this clearly defined
state-system was a wide periphery of Muslim area. In Central Asia, there were
long established Khanates which stretched from eastern Europe to China. In
Southeast Asia, new sultanates were emerging due to the influence of Muslim
teachers and merchants. In West Africa, new states were emerging as a result of
major changes in the tribal structure and medieval empires.
At
this time, the world around these societies was also going through a major
change. In Central Asia, the Russian and the Chinese expansion was putting
pressure on the old Khanates, in Southeast Asia European commercial interests
were coming into conflict with the local societies, the Ottoman forces were
losing battles to European armies and the inner weakness of the Safavid state had reached such an extent that the empire
crumbled in 1736.
Woven
into this complex pattern of inner changes and external pressures was a
significant reformation movement, which emerged throughout the Muslim world
during the eighteenth century. In West Africa, a number of reform-renewal
movements emerged during this century out of a slow process of conversion and
brought political changes. In the second half of the eighteenth century, Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti (c 1750-1811) led a reform movement in the Sahara and
its influence extended deep into West Africa as far as Kankan
on the upper Niger. The leaders of two West African movements, Uthman Dan Fodio and Shaykh Aumad of Massina were influenced by Sidi
al-Mukhtar. Shaykh Uthman b Fudi started his public
career in the 1770s as a wandering teacher and preacher in north-western Hausaland, commanding the right and forbidding the wrong
according to the Islamic law. His efforts succeeded in establishing a Muslim
community that adhered to the precepts of Islam.
This
process of inner struggle and reform was, however, cut short by the invasion
and colonisation of these societies by the European
powers. The Dutch completed the conquest of Indonesia; the Russians and the
Chinese absorbed Inner Asia; the British claimed India, Malaya, parts of the
Middle East, East Africa, Nigeria and other parts of West Africa; France seized
North Africa, much of West Africa and parts of the Middle East.
Thus
at the dawn of the twentieth century, the European powers had completed their
conquest of almost all the Muslim world; at this time independent Muslim states
existed only in Central Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan and they too were
weak and under the influence of the European powers.
This
brief survey brings us to the threshold of the modern period. The map of the
world was redrawn by the European powers in the nineteenth century. Their
expansion and colonisation of the Muslim societies
not only cut short the process of inner evolution in these societies, but also
produced a startling transformation of the most basic institutions, completely
changing the nature of relationship between Muslims and the West. We need to
see this change clearly because therein lie the roots of the present
perceptions of Islam in the West and Muslim perceptions of the West.
(To
be concluded)